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This Article uses New Hampshire v. Lilley, a case recently decided by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, as a starting point for an equal protection
analysis of indecent exposure laws that distinguish between women and men.
After discussing contemporary equal protection jurisprudence and historicizing
these laws, this Article uses the film theorist Laura Mulvey's concept of the
"male gaze" to demonstrate how overbroad generalizations about sex and
sexuality serve as the foundation for this legal distinction. This Article
concludes by emphasizing that municipalities and states may continue to enact
and enforce indecent exposure laws that reflect community standards, so long as
they apply equally to women and men.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Lake Winnipesaukee lies in the heart of New Hampshire. As the state's
largest lake, it is home to hundreds of islands and eight lakeside communities.I
Weirs Beach, a popular tourist destination, is located in the City of Laconia on
the lake's southern shore. 2 Visitors traveling along old Route 3 are greeted by a
distinct sign, a curved arrow harkening beachgoers lit by 200 feet of neon
* Lecturer in Law, Librarian Assistant Professor, and Reference & Instructional Services Librarian,
University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida. For their comments and support, I am
grateful to Aliza Harrigan, Sarah-Marie Horning, and Susan Siggelakis.
' See Bizer's List of Islands of Lake Winnipesaukee, www.bizer.com/winislan.htm (last updated
Aug. 19, 2017).
2 Laconia & Weirs Beach, NH, www.weirsonline.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
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tubing and nearly 700 chaser lightbulbs.3 The beach itself is sandy, broad, and
adjacent to a boardwalk. Once a summer resort for Civil War veterans,' the area
around the beach now features arcades, restaurants, a drive-in theatre, and the
home port of the MS Mount Washington. 5
It is on Weirs Beach that, on Thursday, May 28, 2016, Ginger Pierro
appeared topless, performing yoga poses. 6 In a short time, several of her fellow
beachgoers reported her immodesty to the police.7 Two officers from the
Laconia Police Department soon approached her to request that she cover up.8
When she refused, she was apprehended, wrapped in a towel, and led away. 9
One spectator, Heidi Lilley, was distressed by Ms. Pierro's arrest.' 0 In protest,
Lilley and Kia Sinclair visited Weirs Beach a few days later on May 31, 2016,
to swim and sunbathe topless." Again, beachgoers called the police.'2 When
officers approached Ms. Lilley and Sinclair and asked them to cover up, they
too refused and were arrested while shirtless men looked on. 13
All three women were charged under Laconia City Ordinance Chapter 180
which states, in relevant part, "it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
or intentionally, in a public place: . . . [a]ppear in a state of nudity."' 4 The
ordinance defines "nudity" as "[t]he showing of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, or the
showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part
of the nipple."'"At trial, the defendants submitted a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the ordinance was invalid. On November 20, 2016, Judge James
M. Carroll of New Hampshire's Fourth Circuit Court (Laconia Division) denied
Weirs Beach Sign, WEIRS BEACH, weirsbeach.com/reasons-to-visit/atmosphere/weirs-beach-sign/
(last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
4 BRUCE D. HEALD, NEW HAMPSHIRE IN THE CIVIL WAR 79 (2001).
'Laconia & Weirs Beach, NH, supra note 2.
6 Brief for the State of New Hampshire at 3, State v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (N.H. 2018) (No. 2017-
0116).
' Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
9 Id. at 5.
o0 Id.
" Id.
12 Brief for the State of New Hampshire at 5, New Hampshire v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (N.H. 2018)
(No. 2017-0116).
" Id. at 5-6; Brief for the Defendant at 8-9, New Hampshire v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (N.H. 2018)
(No. 2017-0116).
14 LACONIA, N.H., CODE § 180-2(A)(3) (2017).
'5 Id. § 180-4(A).
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the defendants' motion, concluding that the ordinance "creates no violation of
the Equal Protection clause as it treats all females equally."1 6 The defendants
were found guilty and appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
At oral argument on February 1, 2018, Associate Justice Anna Barbara
Hantz Marconi inquired whether the ordinance is "oriented to a gender role or
ability as opposed to a physical characteristic?"" This Article answers Justice
Hantz Marconi's question in the affirmative. This Article begins with a
discussion of equal protection jurisprudence as it relates to sex-based
classifications. Next, this Article historicizes laws like Laconia City Ordinance
Chapter 180, placing them in the context of public recreational bathing and
bathing attire practices. Then, applying film theorist Laura Mulvey's concept of
the "male gaze," this Article demonstrates how overbroad generalizations about
sex and sexuality animate indecent exposure laws that distinguish between
women and men. This Article concludes by emphasizing that municipalities and
states may continue to enact and enforce indecent exposure laws that reflect
community standards so long as they apply equally to women and men.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "8
Evidence suggests that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
intend it to cover women." Yet, as early as 1870, the noted suffragist Victoria
C. Woodhull asserted that the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment had
made her a free and equal citizen of the United States.20 It would still be over a
century, however, before the U.S. Supreme Court would use the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a law that
discriminated against women.
1 6Lilley v. New Hampshire, No. 450-2016-CR-1603, 1623, 1879 (N.H. 4th Cir. Ct Nov. 20, 2016).
" Oral Argument at 6:24, State v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (N.H. 2019) (No. 2017-0116),
livestream.com/NHJB/events/8417853/videos/183242830.
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'9 See, e.g. JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 89 (1983) ("...there emerges [from the congressional debates] some agreement that it
did not cover women or children"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth
and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161 (1979) ("...the framers of the
[F]ourteenth [Almendment did not contemplate sex equality."); Blanche Crozier, Constitutionality
of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U. L. REV. 723 (1935) ("If in the law and public opinion of
1865-73 race discrimination stood at the head of all discriminations as needing attention, it is certain
that sex discrimination was at the end of the line.").
20 See Victoria C. Woodhull, The Memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull, in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN
SUFFRAGE 443, 443-44 (photo. reprint 1969) (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1881).
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In Reed v. Reed (1971), the Supreme Court struck down an Idaho statute
directing courts to prefer men to women in appointing estate administrators. 21
While purporting to apply the rational basis standard it had always used to
review sex classifications, the Court characterized this state-sanctioned
preference for men as "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause . . . ."22 Although it was clear that the Court was
employing a higher standard of scrutiny, its precise nature would only be
determined in later cases. 23
Debate over the proper standard ensued in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973),
a case in which the Court-applying the principle of equal protection to the
federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-
invalidated a federal law stipulating that a female member of the armed services
could not claim her husband as a dependent unless he relied on her for over half
of his support. 24 Under the same law, a male service member could
automatically "claim his wife as a dependent." 25 Eight of the nine Justices
agreed that the law was unconstitutional but disagreed on the proper standard of
scrutiny. 26 A plurality of four Justices, led by Associate Justice William
Brennan, asserted that sex should be treated as a suspect classification and
applied strict scrutiny. 27 Three concurring Justices, led by Associate Justice
Lewis Powell, maintained that sex should not be characterized as a suspect class
but did not indicate the appropriate level of scrutiny. 28 Only then-Associate
Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented.29
A compromise was finally reached in Craig v. Boren (1976) when a
majority of Justices agreed that "classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to [the] achievement
of those objectives." 30 Using the language of earlier cases, the Court reiterated
21 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
22 Id. at 76.
23 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
24 See generally Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688-91 (plurality opinion) (holding that strict scrutiny
should apply).
25 Id. at 678 (internal quotations omitted).
26 Compare Frontiero 411 U.S. at 688 (holding that strict scrutiny should apply), with Frontiero,
411 U.S. at 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting the Court need not and should not
declare sex a suspect classification in this case).
27 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
28 Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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that such legislation could not rest on "archaic and overbroad generalizations" 31
nor "outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather
than in the marketplace and world of ideas." 32 Applying this intermediate
scrutiny standard, the Court struck down an Oklahoma state law prohibiting the
sale of 3.2% beer to females under the age of eighteen and males under the age
of twenty-one. The Court found that, while Oklahoma's stated goal of "traffic
safety" was an important government interest, the statistics proffered by the
state failed to show "that the gender-based distinction closely serves to achieve
that objective."33
A few years after the Court established an intermediate scrutiny standard
for sex-based classifications, however, majority opinions authored by Justice
Rehnquist illustrated that, although such legislation would not always survive as
it had under rational basis review prior to Reed, nor would it almost always fail
as it might have if the Court had adopted a strict scrutiny standard. For instance,
in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County (1981), the Court upheld a
California statutory rape law that made it a criminal act to engage in sexual
intercourse with a female-but not a male-under the age of eighteen.3 4 The
Court declared that it would sustain "statutes where the gender classification is
not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances," 35 e.g., "provid[ing] for the special
problems of women."36 The Court determined that the California statute
"reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and
pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the male." 37 Thus, a tension
was embodied in federal equal protection jurisprudence dealing with sex-based
classifications." While a legislature could no longer distinguish between
women and men on the basis of "archaic and overbroad generalizations" and
"outdated misconceptions regarding the role of females in the homes," 9 sex-
based classifications that "realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances" remained permissible. 0
3' Id. at 198 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)) (internal quotations omitted).
32 Id. at 198-99 (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)) (quotations omitted).
33 Id. at 199-200.
34 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 475 (1981).
s Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
36 Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975)) (quotations omitted).
37 Id. at 476.
1 Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976), with Michael M, 450 U.S. at 469.
39 Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99.
4 Michael M, 450 U.S. at 469.
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Later cases only served to entrench this tension. In United States v. Virginia
(1996), the Court considered whether Virginia's operation of a men's military
college, namely the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), constituted a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. 41 Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing
for the majority, restated the applicable standard of scrutiny this way:
Focusing on the differential treatment for denial of
opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court
must determine whether the proffered justification is
"exceedingly persuasive." The burden of justification is
demanding and it rests entirely on the State. The State must
show "at least that the [challenged] classification serves
'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives."' The justification must
be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response
to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.42
Applying this standard, the Court ruled that the VMI's male-only
admission policy did not further Virginia's stated objective of "diversity," 43 nor
was it necessary to preserve "the unique VMI method of character development
and leadership training."" Furthermore, the Court found that the parallel
educational opportunity that Virginia had created in response to the litigation,
namely Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary Baldwin
College, did "not cure the constitutional violation." 45
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment but was concerned with
the majority's apparent application of a higher standard than the one crafted by
the Court in Craig.46 Specifically, he took issue with majority's use of the
phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification," 47 arguing that it "is best confined,
as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the applicable
41 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519, 530-31 (1996).
42 Id. at 532 -33 (citations omitted) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982)).
43 Id. at 534-40.
- Id. at 535, 540-46.
45 Id. at 534, 546-56.
46 Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
47 Id.
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test, not as a formulation of the test itself.""8 Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns
were relieved, however, in Nguyen v. I.N.S., a case in which the Court-once
again applying the principle of equal protection to the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-upheld a federal
statute providing that a child born out of wedlock to an American citizen mother
living abroad acquires U.S. citizenship at birth, while a child born out of
wedlock to an American citizen father and a noncitizen mother living abroad
only acquires U.S. citizenship if his or her father takes action before he or she
turns eighteen.49 Both the majority and the dissenting Justices defined
"exceedingly persuasive justification" according to the traditional intermediate
scrutiny formulation, but disagreed on whether I.N.S. had met the requisite
burden."o The majority opinion, written by Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy,
echoed but did not cite the reasoning in Michael M, concluding,
[t]he distinction embodied in the statutory
scheme here at issue is not marked by misconception
and prejudice, nor does it show disrespect for either
class. The difference between men and women in
relation to the birth process is a real one, and the
principle of equal protection does not forbid
Congress to address the problem at hand in a manner
specific to each gender.5 1
48 Id. See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)
("[P]recedents dictate that any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in
public employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification to withstand a
constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
(emphasis added)).
4 Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 59, 71 (2001).
so Id. at 70 ("We have explained that an exceedingly persuasive justification is established by
showing at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
Section 1409 meets this standard." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982))); Id. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] party who seeks to defend a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of sex
must carry the burden of showing an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification. The
defender of the classification meets this burden only by showing at least that the classification
serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724)).
' Id. at 73. The dissenting justices, led by Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, contended that
the government's interests-assuming that they are sufficiently important and not invented post
hoc-could be achieved through "sex-neutral alternatives" such as "[m]odern DNA testing." Id. at
79-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Thus, contemporary federal equal protection jurisprudence in the realm of
sex-based class-ifications continues to rely on the often nebulous distinction
between overbroad generalizations and real differences.
Some originalists, such as the late Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, have
taken umbrage with the above line of cases.52 Yet, the late Judge Robert H.
Bork, the "original originalist,"" believed that women are protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause for much the same reason
that Woodhull did.54 Opining, however, that the various intermediate standards
articulated by the Court had made the case law in this area incoherent, Judge
Bork suggested that the Court ought to adopt the standard advanced by
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne
Living Center.5 5
The generality of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause has
created a jurisprudence that is, if not "incoherent" as Judge Bork suggested, at
least somewhat volatile. Yet, Americans are not governed by the Federal
Constitution alone. Half of America's state constitutions contain a provision
explicitly addressing sex or gender equality and/or discrimination.56 The oldest
52 See, e.g., Legally Speaking: Antonin Scalia, CALIF. LAW. (Jan. 2011),
legacy.callawyer.com/201 1/01/antonin-scalia/ ("In 1868, when the 39th Congress was debating and
ultimately proposing the 14th Amendment, I don't think anybody would have thought that equal
protection applied to sex discrimination . . . if indeed the current society has come to different
views, that's fine. You do not need the Constitution to reflect the wishes of the current society.
Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis of sex. The only issue is
whether it prohibits it. It doesn't. Nobody ever thought that that's what it meant. Nobody ever voted
for that. If the current society wants to outlaw discrimination by sex, hey we have things called
legislatures, and they enact things called laws. You don't need a constitution to keep things up-to-
date. All you need is a legislature and a ballot box."). But see Considering the Role ofJudges Under
the Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
19-20 (2011) (exchange between Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, and
Hon. Antonin Scalia, Associate J., U.S. Supreme Court).
s See Mark Pulliam, The Original Originalist, CITY J. (Summer 2018), https://www.city-
joumal.org/html/robert-bork-1 6039.html.
5 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 329
(1990) ("Though the intentions of the ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment may have been narrow,
the language they used is broad . . . ."). More recently, Steven G. Calabresi (a former clerk to both
Judge Bork and Justice Scalia) and Julia T. Rickert have argued that an originalist interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause not only permits but requires the outcome in United States v. Virginia.
See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1,
9(2011).
ss BORK, supra note 54, at 330 (citing City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
s6 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 36; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § § 8, 31; COLO. CONST.
art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art 1, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. 1, §§ 3, 5; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 18; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12; MD. CONST. art. XLVI;
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30; N.H. CONST. pt. 1,
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of these are found in the state constitutions of California (1879), 1 Wyoming
(1890)," and Utah (1896).59 While seven such provisions are qualified in some
way,6 0 sixteen states have adopted an "equal rights amendment" (ERA), that is
to say an unqualified provision adopted after 1970 and usually resembling the
art. 2; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § 36A; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 46; PA. CONST.
art. 1, § 28; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST.
art. 1, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; id. art. VI, § 1.
5 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business,
profession, vocation, or employment because of sex . . . .").
5 WYo. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness all
members of the human race are equal."). Id. art. 1, § 3 ("Since equality in the enjoyment of natural
and civil rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the
political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of. . . sex, or any
circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly
ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction."). Id. art. VI, § I ("Both male and female citizens
of this state shall equally enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.").
5 UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all
civil, political and religious rights and privileges.").
6 See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 36 ("A. This state shall not grant preferential treatment to or
discriminate against any individual or group on the basis of... sex ... in the operation of public
employment, public education or public contracting. B. This section does not: 1. Prohibit bona fide
qualifications based on sex that are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public
employment, public education or public contracting."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("A person may not
be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because
of sex . . . ."); id. art. I, § 31 ("(a) The State shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting .. .. (c) Nothing in this
section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifications based on sex which are
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting."); LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations.
No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of ...
sex. . . ."); id. art. 1, § 12 ("In access to public areas, accommodations, and facilities, every person
shall be free from discrimination based on race, religion, or national ancestry and from arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination based on ... sex . . . ."); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30 ("(1)
The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group
on the basis of. . . sex .. . in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting... . (3) Nothing in this section prohibits bona fide qualifications based on sex that are
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting."); OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § 36A ("A. The state shall not grant preferential treatment to,
or discriminate against, any individual or group on the basis of .. . sex . .. in the operation of public
employment, public education or public contracting.... C. Nothing in this section shall be
interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifications based on sex that are reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of public employment, public education or public contracting."); R.I. CONST. art.
I, § 2 ("No otherwise qualified person shall, solely by reason of ... gender ... be subject to
discrimination by the state, its agents or any person or entity doing business with the state. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to grant or secure any right relating to abortion or the funding
thereof"); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 11("[T]he right to be free from any governmental discrimination
upon the basis of ... sex . .. shall not be abridged, except that the mere separation of the sexes shall
not be considered discrimination.").
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language of the proposed federal constitutional amendment of the same name.61
Although some state courts have adopted the federal standard of intermediate
scrutiny despite the presence of an ERA in their respective state constitutions, a
majority have relied on independent state grounds to impose a higher
standard.6 2 For instance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that sex is
a suspect classification warranting strict scrutiny on the basis of the equal rights
amendment enshrined in part 1, article II of the New Hampshire Constitution.63
With some understanding of the limits American constitutional law places on
sex-based classifications, as well as the protections against state-sanctioned
6 Compare H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1st Sess. 1971), and S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong. (1st Sess. 1971)
("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex.") with ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 ("No person is to be denied the enjoyment
of any civil or political right because of. . . sex ."); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29 ("Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its political
subdivisions on account of sex."); CONN. CONST. art I, § 20 ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment
of his or her civil or political rights because of... sex . . . ."); FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2 ("All natural
persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which
are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry,
and to acquire, possess and protect property."); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of sex."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18
("The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or
its units of local government and school districts."); IOWA CONST. art. I, § I ("All men and women
are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights--among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness."); MD. CONST. art. XLVI ("Equality of rights under the law
shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I ("Equality under the
law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex. . . ."); MONT. CONST. art. 11, § 4 ("No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation,
or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on
account of... sex ... .); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 11 ("Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by this state on account of. . . sex . . . ."); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18 ("Equality of
rights under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person."); OR. CONST. art. I, § 46
("Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State of Oregon or by any
political subdivision in this state on account of sex."); PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 ("Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the
sex of the individual."); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex .... ); WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § I ("Equality of rights and
responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.").
62 JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 54-56 (2008).
63 See LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350, 1355 (N.H. 1993) ("We apply the strict scrutiny test, in
which the government must show a compelling State interest in order for its actions to be valid,
when the classification involves a suspect class based on race, creed, color, gender, national origin,
or legitimacy. . . ." (citations omitted) (quotations omitted) (superseded by statute on other
grounds); see also Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1346-47 (N.H. 1995) ("Our
constitution guarantees that equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this
state on account of sex. In order to withstand scrutiny under this provision, a common law rule that
distributes benefits or burdens on the basis of gender must be necessary to serve a compelling State
interest." (citations omitted) (quotations omitted)).
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discrimination it affords women, we now turn to investigating the origin of laws
like Laconia City Ordinance Chapter 180.
III. AN ARCHEOLOGY OF RECREATIONAL BATHING (ATTIRE)
"[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic. "'
Any study of social regulation in the United States must begin with the
English Puritans who settled along the northeastern coast of North America four
centuries ago. In approaching Puritan New England, we must harbor no
illusions about the status of women in that time and place. A woman living in
the Massachusetts Bay Colony inhabited a patriarchal society where
"[s]ubmission to God and submission to one's husband were part of the same
religious duty" and "[o]bedience was not only a religious duty but a legal
requirement."65 She was, according to Puritan theology, highly susceptible to
cooperation with Satan.' Even when women, as a collective unit, excelled in
their conformity to the expectations of Puritan life, society saw this excellence
as a threat to male domination of key institutions. 67
Despite this setting, laws regulating dress were strict for women and men
alike, at least as written. In 1634, the Massachusetts Bay Colony, "taking into
consideration the great, superfluous and unnecessary expenses occasioned by
reason of some new and immodest fashions," enacted North America's first
sumptuary law. 68 This statute forbade all persons, "either man or woman," from
wearing, among other items, silver and gold hatbands, girdles, and belts; cloth
woven with gold thread or lace; and sleeves with more than two slashes. 69 The
penalty consisted of forfeiture of the forbidden item. 70 In 1639, the General
Court enacted an even stricter law banning short sleeves and the sale of lace."
I New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
65 LAUREL THATCHER ULRICH, GOOD WIVES: IMAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN IN
NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND 1650-1750, at 6-7 (1982).
5 See generally ELIZABETH REIS, DAMNED WOMEN: SINNERS AND WITCHES IN PURITAN NEW
ENGLAND (1997) (exploring the link between women and mass delusions of satanic witchcraft in
Puritan New England).
6' For instance, the Half-Way Covenant was a remedy designed, at least in part, to address the fact
that women had begun to outnumber men in the membership rolls of Puritan congregations in the
latter half of the 17th century. See PATRICIA U. BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION,
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 111 (1986).
6 I RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND
126 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston: William White 1853) (omitting extensive grammatical
changes to the quotation for clarity).
69 Id.
70 id.
71 Id. at 274.
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By 1651, however, an influx of wealth into the Colony forced the General
Court to make a dispensation for persons with estates valued at 200 pounds or
more; magistrates, public officials, and their wives and children; settled military
officers and soldiers in times of service; and "any other whose education and
employments have been above the ordinary degree, or whose estates [had] been
considerable, though now decayed." 72 The explicit purpose of this legislation
was preventing "men or women of mean condition" from wearing "the garb of
gentlemen."" Thus the earliest laws regulating dress were "gender neutral but
class specific." 74
Like most recreational activities, swimming and public bathing at this time
and for the next 200 years was neither commonplace nor respectable.71 Indeed,
it was an activity ascribed to wayward boys.7 1 In the middle decades of the
eighteenth century, however, elite members of New England society began to
frequent mineral spas that were believed to have preventive and curative
properties. 77 Patrons of these springs were both female and male but almost
always wealthy.7 1 Women and men utilized separate spas, and all bathers wore
garments covering their entire bodies. 79
Across the Atlantic, it was this same will to health that drove the ascendant
class to the sea. Whereas the traditional rulers of English society had long
escaped to provincial estates built by their ancestors, the urban elite-whose
fortunes arose from financial capital-turned to the tranquility of the shore
when they needed to escape the crowded and polluted cities.80 Though their
desire to "[1]ive in the sunshine, swim the sea, [and] [d]rink the wild air's
salubrity"8 1 no doubt arose from the aesthetic notion of oneness with nature
72 4 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND
pt. 1, at 60-61 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston: William White 1854) (omitting extensive
grammatical changes to the quotation for clarity).
* Id. at 60 (omitting extensive grammatical changes to the quotation for clarity).
74 LINDA M. ScoTT, FRESH LIPSTICK: REDRESSING FASHION AND FEMINISM 24 (2005).
7 BRUCE C. DANIELS, PURITANS AT PLAY: LEISURE AND RECREATION IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND
174 (1995).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 175.
71 Id. at 176.
79 id.
8o HELEN M. ROZWADOWSKI, FATHOMING THE OCEAN: THE DISCOVERY AND EXPLORATION OF THE
DEEP SEA 7-9 (2005).
' Ralph Waldo Emerson, Considerations by the Way, in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH
WALDO EMERSON 129, 129 (Barbara L. Packer et al. eds., 2003).
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depicted by the Romanticists in literature and art, they nonetheless imposed
their bourgeois, and thus Victorian, values on these activities. 82
Perhaps the greatest example of this can be found in the invention of the
bathing machine: a device designed to ensure that men would never see women
bathing. 83 A common sight on the beaches of nineteenth-century Britain, the
bathing machine has come to epitomize the excesses of Victorian prudishness. 84
After stepping into a hut with wheels, the user would close the door behind
her." The poor lighting and stale air made the wooden box seem more like a
coffin than a carriage.86 While the cart was backed into the waves by horses, the
user would change from her street clothing into her bathing gown.8 7 Once
parked some distance from the sand and the sight of those present on it, she
would open the back door and descend a step-ladder into the cold water.8 8
Although the bathing machine was popular in Great Britain, its use was far less
frequent in the United States where the advent of recreational bathing came
much later and sex segregation schemes were more intricate. 89
In Contested Water: A Social History of Swimming Pools in America,
historian Jeff Wiltse charts the evolution of the American swimming pool from
the urban construction used by large numbers of working class and immigrant
boys of various races and ethnicities to the private backyard oasis we know
today.90 Throughout this account of the ways racism and classism privatized an
American social institution, Wiltse suggests that issues of sex and sexuality
served as a catalyst for this transformation. 9' The earliest public pools in the
United States appeared in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. 92
Municipalities designed these facilities for hygienic-as opposed to
recreational-bathing, a necessity in an age when cramped inner-city tenements
82 See ALAIN CORBIN, THE LURE OF THE SEA: THE DISCOVERY OF THE SEASIDE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD 1750-1840, at 163-83 (Jocelyn Phelps trans., 1994) (recounting how Romantic writers and
artists, in "propound[ing] a coherent discourse about the sea," transformed the popular conception
of the shore, their language later used in materials created by the emerging tourist industry).
83 KATHRYN FERRY, BEACH HUTS AND BATHING MACHINES 13 (2009).
'4Id. at 22.
8s See id.
8 See M.S.H., Letter to the Editor, Sea-Bathing at Home and Abroad, TIMES (London), Aug. 24,
1871, at 6.
8 FERRY, supra note 83, at 16.
8 See id.
89 Id. at 22.
9 See JEFF WLLTSE, CONTESTED WATER: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SWIMMING POOLS IN AMERICA 4
(2009).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 19-20.
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lacked running water. 9 To prevent interaction between the sexes, "[m]ales and
females either swam in separate pools or used the same pools on different
days." 94
Somewhat later in this period, the British concept of the seaside holiday
arrived in the United States when elite families began summering at coastal
resorts in destinations like Cape Cod.95 As transportation improved, so too did
access to the coast. For instance, America's first public beach, the Revere Beach
Reservation, opened in 1895 and was largely the result of the establishment of
the Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad. 96 As a 1913 article in Municipal
Journal reveals, most of America's first public beaches were segregated
according to sex in much the same way that public pools were. 97
At the turn of the twentieth century, bathing attire "covered most of a
person's body." 8 "A female swimmer [would] w[ear] stockings on her legs and
a puffy skirt that extended down to her knees," a thick blouse with a high
neckline and sleeves extending to her elbows, and a swimming cap.99 A male
swimmer would wear "loose-fitting trunks that extended down to the knee[s]
and a loose top" typically with no sleeves and a high neckline. " The purpose
of this early swimwear was modesty rather than movement.o' Beginning in the
1920s, however, the social landscape of America's public bathing facilities
began to change dramatically as the integration of the sexes coincided with the
introduction of sleeker bathing suit styles. 102 The latter change was, at least in
part, a consequence of the first, resulting in the eroticization of these spaces.' 03
Prior to 1920, authorities engaged in relatively little formal regulation of
swimwear, as social pressure had a tendency to keep bathers "in line with
cultural standards."" Soon, however, female bathers began to push the
" Id. at 19.
94 Id. at 48.
9 See, e.g., id. at 54 ("North End Councilman Samuel Borofsky hailed municipal pools as the poor
man's alternate to Cape Cod").
9 See LEAH A. SCHMIDT, REVERE BEACH 7-8, 24 (2002).
97 A. Linn Bostwick, Municipal Out-of-Door Baths, 34 MUNICIPAL J. 381, 381 (1913).
9 WILTSE, supra note 90, at 109.
* Id. at 109. See also LUCY ADLINGTON, STITCHES IN TIME 324-25 (2015).
1on WILTSE, supra note 90, at 109. See ADLINGTON, supra note 99, at 324.
101 WILTSE, supra note 90, at 109-10.
102 See id. at 88-90.
103 See id. at 89.
'" Id. at 110.
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boundaries of propriety, taking their inspiration from the fitted one-piece
bathing suit championed by professional swimmer and film actress Annette
Kellerman.' 0 Although Kellerman herself had earlier been arrested for
indecency while wearing her signature garment on Revere Beach,106 the sheer
popularity of this fashionable and liberating design defeated institutional
resistance by the end of that decade.o7 In succeeding years, trunks replaced
skirts, tops became more formfitting, and backs became open.'os By 1940, the
two-piece brassiere suit had begun to eclipse the one-piece suit altogether.1 0 9
Beginning in the 1930s, men pushed the boundaries further. While male
trunks became shorter and tighter, the major innovation in male bathing attire
was the omission of the top.o10 The transition to male shirtlessness was not a
smooth one. At no other beach was this legal struggle better encapsulated than
at Coney Island. At that time, the Ordinances of the City of New York stated:
"No person shall wear . . . a bathing suit which indecently exposes or reveals
any part of the wearer's anatomy, or person . This vague statutory
language soon led to disparate enforcement.
On February 22, 1934, Columbia Pictures released It Happened One Night
starring Clark Gable and Claudette Colbert.11 2 The film became notorious for a
scene in which Clark Gable, preparing for bed, removes his shirt."'
Consequently the summer of 1934 saw a spike in shirtless male bathers on the
beaches of New York City. While the police uniformly arrested offenders at
first, city magistrates, exercising their discretion, approached these cases in
different ways. As Isabelle Keating, a reporter for the Brooklyn Daily Eagle,
described it, "a bathing suit that's legal on Monday may be ruled indecent on
Tuesday, if there has been a change of magistrates in the meantime; and the
only way the bather can know whether his topless suit is legally correct is to
learn the magistrates' idiosyncrasies beforehand."ll 4
105 Id.
'6 See Ishbel Johns, Boston Arrest a Mistake, Says Annette, Bos. SUN. GLOBE, Oct. 11, 1953, at A3.
07 WILTSE, supra note 90, at 110-11.
10 Id. at 111.
109Id.
110 Id.
". New York, N.Y., Code of Ordinances ch. 23, art. 21, § 288 (1934).
112 IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT (Columbia Pictures 1934).
" KIMBERLY SEALS ALLERS, THE BIG LETDOWN: How MEDICINE, BIG BUSINESS, AND FEMINISM
UNDERMINE BREASTFEEDING 240 (2017).
114 Isabelle Keating, Coney's Magistrates Are Split on Question of Morals and Shirts, BROOKLYN
DAILY EAGLE, June 24, 1934, at 1.
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Magistrate John D. Mason, for instance, "intended to do all in his power to
rid the beaches of shirtless bathers.""1 5 Concluding that "the defendants'
bathing suits were 'bad enough' even when the tops were worn"' 16 and
rebuking defendants for a lack of "respect for the women and children,"" 7 he
fined thirty-two men $1 each in late June 1934."1 Yet, earlier that same month,
Magistrate Thomas F. Casey had suspended the sentences of five young men
who were charged with violating the same ordinance on the same beach.11 9 But
only a week before Magistrate Casey's ruling, Magistrate Jeanette Brill, the first
woman to serve as a magistrate in Brooklyn,'2 0 had fined eight similar
defendants $1. 121 Addressing the defendants, Magistrate Brill quipped, "[a]ll of
you fellows may be Adonises . . . but there are many people who object to
seeing so much of the human body exposed."'22 For his part, Magistrate
William O'Dwyer "could see nothing indecent in the exposure of the upper part
of the male body" and dismissed the charges against 20 offenders.1 23 He warned
the defendants, however, "that all magistrates did not feel as he did about the
matter." 24 By the end of June 1934, Magistrate David Hirshfield had grown so
tired of dismissing charges against shirtless male bathers that he publicly
rebuked a Coney Island Precinct patrolman.1 25 "Why bring these cases before
me," he demanded, "[when] you know I will throw them out." 26
Hearing the last of these cases, Magistrate David Malbin encouraged the
young defendant before him "to bring suit for false arrest." 27 Shortly thereafter,
.s More Bathers Fined; Coney Magistrate Warns He Will Be Severe on the Shirtless, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1934, at 5 [hereinafter More Bathers Fined].
"
6 id.
" Heat of89.3 Here Sets Year's Mark as Summer Begins, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1934, at 3.
"1 More Bathers Fined, supra note 115.
"1 Shirtless Bathers Freed: But Owners of Uncovered Garbage Cans are Fined $2 Each, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1934, at 13.
1 Jeanette G. Brill, Ex Magistrate, 75, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1964, at 35.
121 Coney Island 'Adonises,' Lacking Shirts, Fined $1, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1934, at 7 (quoting
Magistrate Jeannette Brill).
122 Id.
123 Heat of 89.3 Here Sets Year's Mark as Summer Begins, supra note 117, at 3; see also If Boxers
Bare Chests, Bathers Can, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, June 18, 1934, at 15.
124 Heat of89.3 Here Sets Year's Mark as Summer Begins, supra note 117, at 3.
125 Shirtless Bathers Freed, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1934, at 10.
126 Id. (quoting Magistrate David Hirshfield). See Shirtless Bathers 0. K. to Hirshfield, BROOKLYN
DAILY EAGLE, June 27, 1934, at 1.
127 Isabelle Keating, Police Give in to Shirtless Bathers After Court Advises Victims to Sue,
BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, July 3, 1934, at 1.
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Magistrate Malbin sent a note to Captain Henry Bauer of the Coney Island
Police Precinct advising him of the following:
Under the recent ruling of this court and with no higher
ruling from any other court, it appears that the magistrates
find that the facts are insufficient to constitute a violation of
Chapter 23, Section 288 of the[] Code of Ordinances of the
City of New York, alleging a violation and constituting an
indecency on the beach. Most of the magistrates have agreed
that this is no violation of the law, and the police should
cooperate with the courts. I have consistently held that there is
nothing indecent about the exposure of the upper portion of a
man's body, and I shall continue to do so unless I am reversed
by a higher court. 128
In early July, the head of the Brooklyn Police, Deputy Chief Inspector
Edward V. Bracken, ordered his officers to halt arrests of shirtless male bathers
on the grounds that "city magistrates had refused to punish men brought into
court on charges of violating [the] city ordinance governing bathing attire."' 29
While the Coney Island Chamber of Commerce called on the Board of
Alderman to amend the ordinance to preserve the more conservative
interpretation,130 Mayor Fiorello La Guardia maintained that defining
"decency" was the prerogative of the magistrates.13 1 Yet, it was not so much
the prerogative of the magistrates, but a rapid change in social custom that had
redefined indecency. As Oliver Pilat and Jo Ranson write in Sodom By the Sea:
An Affectionate History of Coney Island,
[W]hen the smoke of battle had cleared, what was
immoral several months before had become sanctioned by
custom....
Naturally the decisions of Coney Island had national
effect. Sometimes lesser beaches spoke sooner, one way or
the other, but when the playground of the masses, where an
incredible million of men, women, and children gathered on a
128 Id. at 2.
129 Storm Cools City as 910 Heat Kills 3, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1934, at 1, 10.
130 Coney Island's Chamber Opens 'Shirtless'Drive, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, July 6, 1934, at 15.
1 Brooklyn's Own Shirt Problem, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, June 23, 1934, at 14 ("An ordinance
passed by the Board of Aldermen backing Captain Bauer's views [that shirtless swimming should
be barred] was vetoed by Mayor LaGuardia on the ground that 'the question of decency is one of
fact to be determined by the courts."').
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warm Sunday, cast its moral vote, the result became
official. 13 2
Thus, it is custom covertly adopted into law which has, over the last eight
decades, governed the ability of men to go shirtless where women cannot. We
must, therefore, inquire whether this custom has any basis in real anatomical
differences and, if not, what assumptions ground the persistence of this legal
distinction?
IV. THE MALE GAZE
"Theorists of [poststructuralism] 'deconstruct' or take apart texts to reveal
the array of assumptions underlying each statement. They point out not only the
implications of what is said, but also how that which is denigrated, excluded, or
otherwise marginalized is also essential to meaning and the influence of the
discourse on power. " 33
Indecent exposure laws like Laconia City Ordinance Chapter 180 prohibit
public exposure of the "genitals" and "buttocks," whether "male or female."l 34
Therefore, the distinction between the female chest and the male chest operates
from the premise that the female chest-like the other censored members of the
human body-is sexual and that the male chest is asexual (or at least less sexual
than the female chest). To properly determine whether the female chest has a
unique sexual purpose, however, we must consult anatomy.
The nipples, being a nearly essential mammalian feature, develop in the
human embryo prior to the introduction of sex-specific hormones.135 Thus the
nipples are found in the female and male anatomies alike. Furthermore, the
female nipple and the male nipple share a similar number of nerves, although
the density of nerves is actually higher in males because the area of the male
nipple tends to be smaller. 136 If the female chest is inherently more sexual than
the male chest, it cannot be the nipples which make it so.
132 OLIVER PILAT & Jo RANSON, SODOM BY THE SEA: AN AFFECTIONATE HISTORY OF CONEY
ISLAND 310-11 (1943).
113 Jill Anne Farmer, A Poststructuralists Analysis of the Legal Research Process, 85 L. LIBR. J.
391, 392 (1993).
134 LACONIA, N.H., CODE § 180-4(A) (2017).
.3 See Eleanor Lawrence, Why Do Men Have Nipples?, NATURE (Aug. 5, 1999),
www.nature.com/news/ I 999/990805/full/news990805- 1html.
"' See generally N. S. Sarhadi et al., An Anatomical Study of the Nerve Supply of the Breast,
Including the Nipple and Areola, 49 BRIT. J. PLASTIC SURGERY 156 (1999) (comparing the nerves
in the nipples of males and females).
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A key difference between the female chest and the male chest does exist,
however, in the relative development of the mammary glands. While the female
mammary glands mature fully during puberty, allowing for lactation, the male
mammary glands rarely develop fully and typically do not lactate.13 7 Moreover,
the female mammary glands are pronounced owing to the presence of more
fatty tissue.' 3 8 Yet, these differences are seemingly maternal rather than sexual,
and our society has come to recognize that a woman's mammary glands are not
inherently indecent. 139
Perhaps, then, the female chest is not more sexual than the male chest, but
merely more sexualized. If the female chest is hypersexualized, it is because it
is an erotic object of the society's dominant gaze, that of the heterosexual male.
This hypersexualization is likely the result of "pre-existing patterns of
fascination already at work within the individual subject and the social
formations that have moulded him."l4 o In her 1975 essay, Visual Pleasure and
Narrative Cinema, the feminist film theorist Laura Mulvey conceptualized the
"male gaze" to explain how "the unconscious of patriarchal society has
structured film form."l41 While Mulvey's male gaze has traditionally been used
as an analytical tool for examining the visual arts and literature, it can also be a
useful lens for understanding the basis of sex classifications used to regulate the
female body.
Discussing film, Mulvey observes that, "[t]he woman displayed has
functioned on two levels: as erotic object for the characters within the screen
story, and as erotic object for the spectator within the auditorium, with a shifting
tension between the looks on either side of the screen."1 42 Law is, of course,
different from film in terms of medium and purpose. Yet, parallels can be drawn
in order to investigate how the male gaze animates law.'43 The laws at the heart
of this Article are, admittedly, distinctly suited for such an adaption.
"' See generally Thomas H. Kunz & David J. Hosken, Male Lactation: Why, Why not and Is It
Care?, 24 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 80 (2009) (discussing the differences between male
and female mammary glands).
1 See GRAY'S ANATOMY: THE ANATOMICAL BASIS OF CLINICAL PRACTICE 946 (Susan Standring
ed., 41st ed. 2016).
1' See Meghan Boone, Lactation Law, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1827, 1835 (2018) (recounting the rise
of laws and policies accommodating nursing mothers).
4o Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, 16 SCREEN, no. 3, Autumn 1975, at 6.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 11-12.
143 Several legal scholars have attempted to adapt Mulvey's concept of the male gaze for use in
analyzing various areas of law. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Copyright's Male Gaze: Authorship and
Inequality in a Panoptic World, 41 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 343, 343 (2018); Yxta Maya Murray,
"We Just Looked at Them As Ordinary People Like We Were:" The Legal Gaze and Women's
Bodies, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 252, 285-86 (2017); Yxta Maya Murray, Peering, 22 GEO. J.
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As in the films that Mulvey critiques, the female form is also the sexual
object in the indecent exposure laws under discussion. Yet, whereas the male
gaze in film operates to display the image of the female body, these laws seek to
conceal the parts of it that might arouse erotic feelings in the viewer, protecting
him from distraction, temptation, and inconvenience. This viewer-presumably
male and heterosexual-is the beneficiary of these laws. His view corresponds
with the view of Mulvey's "characters within the screen story."'"
What of Mulvey's "spectator within the auditorium?"l 45 Surely the
relationship of the law to the viewer viewing the woman as a sexual object is
too attenuated for serious consideration. If, however, the phenomenon-the
promulgation of the law and the resulting compliance or violation-is viewed
holistically, we begin to detect the presence of another entity: the legislator. The
view of the legislator corresponds with the view of Mulvey's "spectator within
the auditorium" because, although he has far more power than does a member
of the audience, he conceptualizes both the already-objectified woman and the
viewer-beneficiary as objects. It is this legislative gaze acting on behalf of the
viewer-beneficiary that must be interrogated for its underlying assumptions.
In sanctioning exposure of the male chest and prohibiting exposure of the
female chest, the legislator concludes that the female chest will be problematic
for the viewer-beneficiary. Exposure of the male chest, on the other hand, poses
no problem. As Mulvey observes, "the male figure cannot bear the burden of
sexual objectification."' 46 Implicit in this assumption, however, is an archaic
generalization about female sexuality, for it supposes that the female is not
distracted by the exposed male chest. Presumably this is because the intensity of
the erotic feelings that the male chest causes the female viewer is not sufficient
to warrant restricting the freedom of the male. Such an assumption harkens back
to the old stereotype that women, by their very nature, have a weaker sex drive
than men. When, however, divergent cultural practices are studied
comparatively, it is difficult not to conclude that-even if women and men can
be said to express sexual desire differently-it is localized socialization that
restrains female sexual desire in such a way that it appears less intense than
male sexual desire.1 47
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 249, 252 (2015); Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze:
Narrative ofLaw and Inequality in Popular Film, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 243, 244 (1991).
'" Mulvey, supra note 140, at 11.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 12.
147 See generally Brooke A. Scelza, Choosy But Not Chaste: Multiple Mating in Human Females, 22
EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 259 (2013) (contrasting Western assumptions about female
sexuality with the practices of, among others, the Himba (an indigenous society located in northern
Namibia) and the Mosuo (an ethnic group found in China's Yunnan and Sichuan provinces)).
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Yet, even if male sexual desire could be shown to be intrinsically more
intense than female sexual desire, the legislator makes another, perhaps more
sinister, assumption: the inexistence of the homosexual male. For most of
Western history, it was commonly believed that those engaging in homosexual
sexual activity were merely deviant heterosexuals. 4 8 Only with the writings of
the German author Karl Heinrich Ulrichs (1825-1895) and the Austrian
journalist Karl-Maria Kertbeny (1824-1882) did the West begin to take
seriously the notion that homosexuality might be an inherent and inalterable
trait.' 49 The nature-nurture debate aside, today it is widely acknowledged that
homosexuality is not a choice. This is not only the position of the American
Psychological Association' but even the United State Conference of Catholic
Bishops.'"' Indeed, American constitutional law now holds state-sanctioned
discrimination against gays and lesbians to be impermissible on this very
basis. 152
Yet, indecent exposure laws like Laconia City Ordinance Chapter 180-
while protecting the heterosexual male viewer-beneficiary against the burden of
erotic feelings aroused by the bare female chest-make no consideration for the
homosexual male viewer who, in the presence of the exposed male chest,
experiences these feelings with the same intensity as his heterosexual
148 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, I THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE WILL TO KNOWLEDGE 43 (Robert
Hurley trans. 1978) (1976) ("As defined by ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category
of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them.").
149 See ROBERT BEACHY, GAY BERLIN: BIRTHPLACE OF A MODERN IDENTITY 3-41 (2014)
(examining how the respective writings of Ulrichs and Kertbeny laid the foundation for later
research and activism that would serve to normalize homosexuality in the eyes of the medical
community and society at large).
"' The APA regards "homosexual behavior" as "normal aspects of human sexuality" and asserts
that "most people experience little or no sense of choice about their sexual orientation." AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS: FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HOMOSEXUALITY 2, 3 (2008), www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/orientation.pdf.
' The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops holds that, while "homosexual inclination is
objectively disordered," "a considerable number of people who experience same-sex attraction
experience it as an inclination that they did not choose." U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
MINISTRY TO PERSONS WITH A HOMOSEXUAL INCLINATION: GUIDELINES FOR PASTORAL CARE 5, 7
(2006), www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/homosexuality/upload/minstry-
persons-homosexual-inclination-2006.pdf.
152 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-69 (2003) ("The absence of legal prohibitions
focusing on homosexual conduct may be explained in part by noting that according to some scholars
the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the late 19th
century. Thus early American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead
sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally. This does not suggest approval of
homosexual conduct. It does tend to show that this particular form of conduct was not thought of as
a separate category from like conduct between heterosexual persons." (citations omitted)). See also
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) ("Only in more recent years have psychiatrists
and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and
immutable.").
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counterpart."'3 Thus his existence is discounted entirely, or, if indeed the
legislator considers the experience of the homosexual male at all, perhaps it is
assumed that fear of violent reprisal at the hands of the heterosexual male
tempers his erotic feelings. 154 Of course, the most troubling characteristic of
laws like Laconia City Ordinance Chapter 180 is their propensity to objectify
and unduly regulate the female body, restricting the freedom of women in the
service of the viewer-beneficiary: the heterosexual male.
V. CONCLUSION
Should the distinction between women and men found in Laconia City
Ordinance Chapter 180 survive strict scrutiny under part 1, article II of the New
Hampshire Constitution? '5 5 New Hampshire's strict scrutiny standard requires
that the government demonstrate that the legislation under review is "necessary
to achieve a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet
that end." 1 56 Furthermore, "the government may not rely upon justifications that
are hypothesized or 'invented post hoc in response to litigation."" ' Finally,
"[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the [government's] purpose, the
legislature must use that alternative."' 5 8
In its brief to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the only compelling
interest that the State could summon was "protecting females from non-
"' The inclination of the homosexual male to view the male chest erotically can be observed in the
number of faceless torsos one finds on a gay dating app, as well as the number of shirtless men who
feature in advertisements targeting gay male consumers.
1' According to FBI statistics, of the 1,303 reported hate crimes based upon sexual orientation
committed in 2017 (the latest year for which statistics are available), 758 targeted gay males. Table
4: Offense Type by Bias Motivation, 2017, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topic-
pages/tables/table-4.xls (last visited Apr. 27, 2019). Of these, 237 were aggravated assaults, 383
were simple assaults, and two were murders or acts of non-negligent manslaughter. Id. The only
groups subject to more incidents of bias-motivated crime were African Americans (2,358), Jews
(976), and whites (844). Id. The disproportionate number of hate crimes committed against gay men
is unsurprising in view of the American criminal justice system's history of condoning violence
against homosexual men at the hands of self-identified heterosexual men, i.e., the "gay panic de-
fense." See generally Cynthia Lee, Masculinity on Trial: Gay Panic in the Criminal Courtroom, 42
Sw. L. REV. 817 (2013) (discussing and critiquing the "gay panic defense"); Cynthia Lee, The Gay
Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 471 (2008) (analyzing the use of the "gay panic defense" in
criminal courtrooms).
15 See LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350, 1355 (N.H. 1993). See also Cheshire Med. Ctr. v.
Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344, 1346-47 (N.H. 1995).
"6 Cmty. Ress. for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707, 718 (N.H. 2007) (quoting
Gonya v. Comm'r, N.H. Ins. Dep't, 899 A.2d 278, 292 (2006) (Broderick, C.J., concurring
specially)).
151 Id. at 721 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
1ss State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 257 (N.H. 2003) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citation omitted)).
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consensual touching of their breasts" on the basis of the fact that "female
breasts generally have been regarded in society as an erogenous zone."'59 As
discussed in the previous Part, shielding the viewer-beneficiary from temptation
is an implicit function of these laws. Yet, even if we are to believe that this is
the legislator's rationale and that this justification is not merely "hypothesized
or invented post hoc in response to litigation,"1 60 we are left with a scenario in
which the freedom of the female citizen is paternalistically restricted for her
own good. It is interesting that women alone are expected to bear the entire
burden for their safety; rarely, if ever, have sex classifications been employed to
similarly burden men.
Moreover, one wonders what other regulations could be justified on this
basis. Could a municipality, for instance, institute a "female curfew," reasoning
that female citizens have been disproportionally affected by a recent late-night
violent crime wave? The problem with such a curfew is not necessarily the
absence of a compelling government interest-"public safety" likely clearing
this hurdle-but the restrictiveness of the measure, for the municipality could
achieve the same objective by imposing a curfew on women and men alike.1 61
Likewise, Laconia City Ordinance Chapter 180 should ultimately fail
because, even if the government's objective is a compelling one, a "less
restrictive alternative would serve the [government's] purpose,"' 62 namely
making the restriction uniform. Indeed, the State of New Hampshire
contemplates just such a change in its brief. The State writes "there is no reason
why this Court cannot simply strike the word 'female' from the part of the
ordinance at issue here." 63
A more difficult question is whether an indecent exposure law like Laconia
City Ordinance Chapter 180 could survive intermediate scrutiny. As previously
stated, the federal standard dictates that,
"I Brief for the State of New Hampshire, supra note 6, at 20-21 (quoting People v. Carranza, No.
B240799, 2013 WL 3866506, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 24, 2013)).
16o Cmty. Res. for Justice, 917 A.2d at 721 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). The legislative
history of Laconia City Ordinance Chapter 180 "is virtually silent on the motivation for enacting the
ordinance beyond the ordinance's conclusory 'purpose and findings' section and the fact that it was
proposed by the Public Safety Subcommittee and listed in the 'Public Safety' section of City
Council Meeting Minutes." Brief for the Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New
Hampshire in Support of Defendants Heidi Lilley, Kia Sinclair & Ginger Pierro at 15, State v.
Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (N.H. 2018) (No. 2017-0116).
161 Such a curfew may, of course, be subject to other constitutional limitations.
162 State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d at 257 (N.H. 2003) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
6 Brief for the State of New Hampshire, supra note 6, at 23.
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the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered
justification is "exceedingly persuasive." The burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.
The State must show "at least that the [challenged]
classification serves 'important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives."' The
justification must be genuine, not hypothetical or invented
post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females. 1
Under this formulation of intermediate scrutiny, such a law should still fail
because, even assuming that the justification is substantially related to achieving
an important government interest that is not hypothetical or invented post hoc,
the classification is not based on real differences so much as overbroad and
archaic generalizations, namely the comparative weakness of female sexual
desire, the inexistence or relegation of the homosexual male, and the propriety
of female sacrifice for the benefit of the heterosexual male. In fact, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently found that a similar ordinance likely fails
intermediate scrutiny, concluding that "the City's professed interest in
protecting children derives not from any morphological difference between
men's and women's breasts but from the negative stereotypes depicting
women's breasts, but not men's breasts, as sex objects." 1 65
Shockingly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declined to subject
Laconia City Ordinance Chapter 180 to strict or intermediate scrutiny.1 66
Although earlier precedent held that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard
for reviewing sex-based classifications under part 1, article II of the New
Hampshire Constitution, the majority reasoned that laws which "impose[]
requirements on both men and women, but appl[y] to women somewhat
differently" do not necessarily trigger strict scrutiny.1 67 Relying on custom, as
well as the guidance of courts in other jurisdictions, the majority concluded that
the "ordinance does not classify on the basis of gender" because it "prohibits
both men and women from being nude in a public place" and "nudity in the case
'6 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
65 Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792, 803 (10th Cir. 2019). But
see Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 1577
(2019) (holding that the "list of intimate body parts is longer for women than men, but that's wholly
attributable to the basic physiological differences between the sexes").
'6 New Hampshire v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (N.H. 2019).
167 Id. at 206 (emphasis in original).
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of women is commonly understood to include the uncovering of breasts."l 68
Accordingly, the majority applied rational basis review and upheld the
ordinance.' 69
The dissenting justices countered that the majority's decision to apply
rational basis "find[s] [no] support in the plain language of the ordinance, the
New Hampshire Constitution, or [New Hampshire Supreme Court]
precedent."i'o Dismissing the majority's reliance on "the outcome of cases
decided through [the] application of less rigorous standards,"' 7 ' the dissent
focused its attention on the presence of an ERA in the New Hampshire
Constitution, writing that "[w]e ... thwart the very protections the Equal Rights
Amendment was enacted to provide, if we allow stereotypical notions about
women's bodies to alter our analysis of the straightforward question of whether
Laconia's ordinance classifies on the basis of gender." 72 Analyzing the
ordinance under the strict scrutiny standard, the dissenting justices concluded
that "Laconia's ordinance violates part I, article 2 of the New Hampshire
Constitution." 7 3
Ironically, the majority chastises the dissenting justices, writing that "the
siren call of 'equal rights' [should not] lead us to forget our constitutional role.
In the absence of a suspect classification or a fundamental right, courts will not
second guess legislative bodies as to the wisdom of a specific law." 7 4 Yet it is
the majority that goes to great lengths to contort the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence to avoid subjecting Laconia City Ordinance 180 to strict scrutiny.
This results-oriented approach is likely rooted in the majority's anxiety about
the social implications of invalidating the ordinance. Such anxieties are, as we
have seen, neither new nor uncommon.
There are individuals and communities across this country that are troubled
by the potential invalidation of laws prohibiting exposure of the female chest.
Many deeply and sincerely believe that the presence of bare female breasts in
public spaces undermines morality. As discussed earlier, this was the very same
argument invoked when men began to appear shirtless on beaches like Coney
Island in the early 1930s. Yet, well it is true that the plaintiffs in Lilley v. New
68 Id. at 208. (quoting Eck] v. Davis, 124 Cal. Rptr. 685, 696 (Ct. App. 1975)).
'69 Id. at 208-09.
70 Id. at 218 (Basset, J., dissenting).
.' Id. at 222 (emphasis in original).
172 New Hampshire v. Lilley, 204 A.3d at 224 (Basset, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 227.
1 Id. at 210 (citing Winnisquam Reg. Sch. Dist. v. Levine, 880 A.2d 369, 371 (N.H. 2005)).
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Hampshire are activists affiliated with a movement called "Free the Nipple," 7 5
this does not mean that states and municipalities have no choice but to adopt
their philosophy. City and state governments could, in the alternative, amend
indecent exposure laws in order to make the regulation uniform. Such a change
would not only achieve all the professed purposes of the current regime without
violating equal protection, but would also serve to further de-eroticize public
spaces. If such an outcome seems absurd, we would do well to evaluate whether
it would be preferable to preserve laws that restricts the freedom of women for
the benefit of heterosexual men.
1' Id. at 204.
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